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This article analyses the reduction of labour costs as a factor
which helps to raise the competitiveness of industrial enter-
prises. It first reviews non-wage labour costs, both for workers
with permanent contracts and those with only temporary con-
tracts, or with no contracts at all, in order to show the differ-
ences that exist in non-wage labour costs according to the type
of contract of the workers or their unregistered status, and the
impact of these differences on the labour costs for each type of
worker and the average labour costs. It then goes on to consider
the evolution of labour costs in industry and the different levels
they assume according to the deflator used, because of the
changes in relative prices which accompanied the early years of
the economic and trade openness process which has taken place
in the region. It then analyses the evolution of labour costs in in-
dustry by type of contract and the changes in the average labour
costs in the sector brought about by the dual strategy of reduc-
ing non-wage labour costs and changing the contract structure
of industrial employment; describes the effect of exchange-rate
lag on average labour costs and competitiveness, and calculates
how the latter would have evolved if there had not been such a
lag. Finally, some proposals are made for raising the competi-
tiveness of labour in the countries of the region.
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I
Introduction
Some of the most important changes in labour and
social security legislation in recent years have been
aimed at reducing labour costs. The argument has
been that as labour costs are a major component in
total production costs, their reduction would make it
possible to lower the cost of the goods produced or
the services provided, thus making the enterprises fa-
voured by this policy more competitive.
The policy of reducing labour costs is reflected
in two strategies which are sometimes applied simul-
taneously: on the one hand, reducing social security
contributions and labour taxes –that is to say, the
non-wage component of total labour costs– and on
the other, encouraging the hiring of certain types of
workers (especially young people without previous
work experience and workers who have been out of
a job for a long time) through subsidies and/or tax
exemptions.
The aim of the latter strategy is to reduce the
cost of hiring such workers and thus encourage their
employment. In the case of young people, for exam-
ple, it is necessary to weigh the relative cost of em-
ploying an inexperienced young person of lower
productivity against that of employing an experi-
enced adult worker. These relative costs are balanced
if the State absorbs part of the non-wage labour cost
of the worker in question (mainly the social security
costs), thus reducing the labour burdens or taxes for
the employer, or if the employer is exempted from all
or part of the contributions he would otherwise be
obliged to pay under the labour legislation.
This new approach to labour and social security
legislation (which, of course, also has other aims as
well as the reduction of costs) has given rise to con-
siderable discussion. In general, employers consider
that reducing labour costs, together with more flexi-
ble forms of hiring and greater mobility of workers
within the firm, will make companies more competi-
tive because they will be able to offer their products
at more interesting prices and will be able to adapt
their organization and labour force more easily to
changes in demand.
For their part, although workers acknowledge
the importance of reducing business costs they fear
adverse repercussions on their income and/or on the
extent and quality of protection systems, especially
as regards health and pensions.
The question arises, then, as to whether it is re-
ally necessary to reduce labour costs in order to
make firms more competitive. This study seeks to
provide an answer to that question. For reasons of
availability of information, we have limited our anal-
ysis to the manufacturing sector, and productivity re-
fers to labour and not to the totality of the factors
involved.1
This article is an updated and expanded version
of an earlier study (ILO, 1997) and seeks to estimate
changes in the level of competitiveness on the basis
of variations in productivity and average labour
costs. This latter aspect (average labour costs) was
not taken into account in the original study, as on that
occasion the labour cost analysed was that of a work-
er with a “permanent” contract. However, as in re-
cent years there has been a significant increase in the
demand for workers on fixed-term contracts and,
even more so, for unregistered workers without any
social security coverage, it was considered that the
cost of an employee with a permanent contract did
not properly reflect the average labour costs in the
industrial sector. We have therefore estimated the av-
erage cost given by the sum of the costs of workers
on each type of contract (and also of workers without
any contract), weighted by the share of each of these
types of worker in the overall industrial employment
structure. Likewise, the data on labour productivity
used here refer to the value added per hour worked
and not, as in the original publication, the physical
output per hour worked.
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 The views expressed in this study do not necessarily repre-
sent the official position of the ILO.
1 Although productivity, defined in this way, refers to only a
single factor, it generally displays a correlation with total factor
productivity. Hofman (1996) shows that this was so in the cases
of Argentina, Chile and Mexico in the period from 1950 to
1992.
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II
Evolution of non-wage labour costs
in the manufacturing sector
Non-wage labour costs are generally calculated as
the percentage of the gross wage that the employer
must pay in addition to cover the social security ben-
efits laid down in each country’s legislation. Most
studies also include deferred wages in respect of bo-
nuses (“Thirteenth month”, etc.) and holidays. How-
ever, both the contributions that must be paid by the
employer and the deferred wages in respect of bo-
nuses and holidays are calculated on the basis of the
legislation applicable to workers with permanent
contracts, and do not take account of the fact that in
some countries workers with fixed-term contracts are
subject to different treatment, while in the case of
workers without a contract employers do not make
any –or hardly any– social security contributions at
all. In this section we therefore make a distinction
between the non-wage labour costs of each of these
three types of workers.
1. Non-wage labour costs of workers with
permanent contracts
In the countries studied, the evolution of the work-
ers’ social security deductions2 has been as follows:
in Argentina they rose from 14% of gross wages in
1980 to 16% in 1990 and 17% in 1998 (table 1). In
Peru, they rose from 6% in 1990 to 19% in 1994, be-
cause of the pension system reform, but were later
reduced to 11.4%. In the other countries they re-
mained constant: 21% in Chile and between 9% and
5% in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. It should be
noted that in Chile, as in Peru, the deductions had
been raised earlier because of the privatization of the
pension system.
The bigger deductions paid by workers in Chile
and Peru are due to pension system reform, which
shifted the entire responsibility for financing the
system to the workers, so that they now have to pay
the contributions previously made by their employ-
ers, as well as the share they had always paid them-
selves under the old system. These increased
deductions were offset by a proportional increase in
gross wages.
On the employers’ side, their overall contribu-
tions (as a percentage of gross wages) evolved as fol-
lows: in Argentina they were reduced from 59.6% in
1980 to 56.1% in 1990 and 44.8% in 1998 (table 1);
in Brazil they rose slightly from 57.6% in 1990 to
58.2% of the gross wage in 1994 and have since re-
mained unchanged at that level; in Chile they have
stood at 38% since the labour reforms of the 1980s;
in Colombia they went down from 47.6% in 1980 to
46.8% in 1990 but rose again to 49% in 1998, and in
Peru they likewise went down from 66.8% in 1990 to
62.9% in 1994 only to rise again later to 65.6%.
In relative terms (total contributions and other
costs payable by employers/costs payable by work-
ers), contributions range from close to 40% in Peru
to 27.5% in Chile. In Argentina they amount to 31%
and in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to around 35%.
The calculations of non-wage labour costs made
in this article differ from the estimates made in other
studies and even in previous studies by the ILO itself.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the rates used
in such areas as accident insurance, family allow-
ances and severance pay are estimated averages, ad-
justed yearly on the basis of the information
provided by firms and official bodies for the year be-
fore the date of the study. Consequently, as the stud-
ies are updated the rates are modified to reflect more
accurately what actually occurred. Secondly, in some
countries the calculation methodology used has been
changed. This is so, for example, in the case of sup-
plementary income in Chile: this is estimated to be
equivalent to 19.8% of gross wages, bearing in mind
that most Chilean wage-earners have a monthly in-
come equal to twice the official minimum wage, in
contrast with earlier studies in which average income
was taken as being equal to the minimum wage and a
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2 The term “deductions” is used to refer to the amount deducted
from a worker’s gross wage to cover his labour benefits, while
“contributions” refers to the amount, over and above a worker’s
wages, that his employer must pay for the same purpose.
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TABLE 1
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru: Breakdown
of non-wage labour costs of permanent and temporary workers
Argentina
1980 1990 1994 a 1998
Permanent Permanent Permanent Permanent Temporary
A. Gross remuneration 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net monthly remuneration b 97.1 95.1 94.1 91.3
B. Worker’s contributions 14.0 16.0 17.0 17.0
Pension 11.0 10.0 11.0 11.0
Social welfare c 4.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
C. Employer’s contributions 59.6 56.1 56.1 44.8 30.9
1. Contributions 43.9 40.4 40.4 29.1 17.7
Pension 15.0 11.0 16.0 9.9 5.0
Social welfare c 4.5 8.0 8.0 6.2 5.1
Family allowances 12.0 9.0 7.5 4.7 2.3
Unemployment fund - - 1.5 0.9 0.5
IPD d 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 2.8
Accident insurance 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Housing fund 5.0 5.0 - - -
2. Other costs payable by employer 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.7 13.2
Supplementary payments e 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
Holidays 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 4.9
D. Total cost (A + C) 159.6 156.1 156.1 144.8 130.9
Ce/Ct f 37.3 35.9 35.9 30.9 23.6
Brazil
1990 1994 1998
Permanent Permanent Permanent Temporary
A. Gross remuneration 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net monthly remuneration 99.3 99.3 99.3
B. Worker’s contributions 9.0 9.0 9.0
Pension 9.0 9.0 9.0
C. Employer’s contributions 57.6 58.2 58.2 37.2
1. Contributions 38.2 38.8 38.8 25.9
Social security 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
Ind. Social Services 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.75
Ind. Training Services 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5
National Institute for Land Settlement and Agrarian
Reform 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Education 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.25
Brazilian Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
Support Service - 0.6 0.6 0.3
Length of Service Guarantee Fund 8.0 8.0 8.0 2.0
Accident insurance 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0
Severance compensation 3.0 3.0 3.0 -
2. Other costs payable by employer 19.4 19.4 19.4 11.3
Supplementary payments 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.5
Holidays 11.3 11.3 11.1 2.8
D. Total cost (A + C) 157.6 158.2 158.2 137.2
Ce/Ct f 36.5 36.8 36.8 27.1
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A. Gross remuneration 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net remunerationb 98.7 98.7 98.7
B. Worker’s contributions 21.1 21.1 21.1
Pension 13.5 13.5 13.5
Health insurance 7.0 7.0 7.0
Accident insurance 0.6 0.6 0.6
C. Employer’s contributions 38.0 38.0 38.0
1. Contributions 10.9 10.9 10.9
Severance compensation fund 8.3 8.3 8.3
Accident insurance g 2.6 2.6 2.6
2. Other costs payable by employer 27.1 27.1 27.1
Holidays 7.3 7.3 7.3
Supplementary payments h 19.8 19.8 19.8
D. Total cost (A + C) 138.0 138.0 138.0
Ce/Ct f 27.5 27.5 27.5
Colombia
1988 1996
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
A. Gross remuneration 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net remunerationb 100.9 100.9
B. Worker’s contributions 7.4 7.4
Pension 3.4 3.4
Health insurance k 4.0 4.0
Accident insurance
C. Employer’s contributions 47.6 29.3 52.9 52.9
1. Contributions 33.5 29.3 38.8 38.8
Health insurance k 4.7 4.7 8.0 8.0
Pension 4.3 4.3 10.1 10.1
Severance compensation fund 13.5 i 9.3 9.3 9.3
National Training Service 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Accident insurance 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.4
Family allowances 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Family Welfare Institute 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
2. Other costs payable by employer 14.1 - 14.1 14.1
Holidays 5.8 - 5.8 5.8
Supplementary payments j 8.3 - 8.3 8.3
D. Total cost (A + C) 147.6 129.3 152.9 152.9
Ce/Ct f 32.2 22.7 34.6 34.6
Mexico
1980 1990 1994 1998
Permanent Permanent Permanent Permanent
A. Gross remuneration 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net remuneration b 105.9 105.9 105.9 105.9
B. Worker’s contributions 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1
Pension 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Health insurance k 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
C. Employer’s contributions 40.6 46.8 48.7 48.8
1. Contributions 19.0 25.2 27.1 27.2
Pension 3.8 4.2 5.7 5.8
Health insurance k 5.6 8.4 8.8 8.8
Day Nurseries 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Retirement - 2.0 2.0 2.0
Accident insurance 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Housing fund 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Wage tax 1.0 - - -
Payroll tax - 2.0 2.0 2.0
2. Other costs payable by employer 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6
Supplementary payments 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Holidays 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6
D. Total cost (A + C) 140.6 146.8 148.7 148.8
Ce/Ct f 28.9 31.9 32.8 32.8
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rate of 25% was applied. Furthermore, these calcula-
tions do not include the cost of such items as official
holidays and Sundays, maternity leave, sick leave,
etc., for the reasons explained in ILO (1997).
2. Non-wage labour costs of workers with
temporary contracts, or with no contract
at all
In three of the countries studied (Chile, Mexico and
Peru),3 the rates of contributions applied to workers
with temporary contracts under the current legisla-
tion are the same as for workers with permanent con-
tracts, but in the other three (Argentina, Brazil and
Colombia) they are different. In Argentina, the
non-wage labour costs for these workers averaged
30.9% of gross wages (14 percentage points less than
for a worker with a permanent contract and nearly 15
points less than in 1990, when there was no promo-
tion of temporary contracts). In Brazil, it is estimated
that the non-wage labour costs for a worker with a
fixed-term contract amount to 37.2% of his gross
wage: 21 percentage points less than those for a per-
manent worker. In Colombia, the non-wage labour
costs for a temporary worker have increased from
29.2% of the gross wage in 1988 (before Law 50) to
52.9% at present, bringing them up to a similar level
to that of a worker with a permanent contract.
We thus see that, except in Colombia, the
non-wage costs for temporary workers have re-
mained unchanged or gone down, which (together





A. Gross remuneration 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net remuneration b 113.0 100.0 108.4
B. Worker’s contributions 6.0 19.0 11.4
Pension l 3.0 16.0 11.4
Health insurance 3.0 3.0 -
C. Employer’s contributions 66.8 62.9 65.6
1. Contributions 36.8 32.9 35.85
Pension 6.0 - -
Health insurance 6.0 6.0 9.0
Accident insurance m 3.0 4.0 4.0
Housing fund 6.0 6.0 5.0
SENATI (training) 1.5 1.2 0.75
CTS (severance compensation) 8.3 9.7 9.7
Family allowances 6.0 6.0 7.4
2. Other costs payable by employer 30.0 30.0 29.7
Holidays 11.0 11.0 9.9
Supplementary payments 19.0 19.0 19.8
D. Total cost (A + C) 166.8 162.9 165.6
Ce/Ct f 40.0 38.6 39.6
Source: Prepared by the ILO on the basis of official information.
a The employers’ contributions for pensions, social welfare, family allowances and the unemployment fund were reduced in 1994 by 30%
in Buenos Aires and by 80% in the poorest provinces. It is estimated that the average reduction was 40%.
b Net remuneration = gross remuneration - worker’s contributions + supplementary income.
c Health insurance, including contribution to the National Institute of Social Services for Retired Persons (INSSJ&P).
d Severance compensation. The 1994 rate was assumed for 1980 and 1990.
e Corresponds to bonuses or extra wages.
f Ce = contributions and other costs payable by the employer; Ct = costs payable by workers.
g Average rate; maximum rate = 3.9%.
h Workers’ participation in profits, with average wage equal to 2 official minimum wages.
i Includes retroactive unemployment benefits.
j Corresponds to bonuses or extra wages.
k Mexican Social Security Institute: private sector.
l Industrial worker enrolled in a private Pension Fund Management Company (AFP).
m Average. Rates range from 1.0% to 12.2%.
3 Obviously, the costs in respect of deferred wages, length of
service, severance pay, etc., are proportional to the duration of
the contract.
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with the fact that they receive lower wages than per-
manent workers) should give rise to greater demand
for this type of worker. Although this has in fact oc-
curred, it is interesting to note that there has not been
an even bigger increase in the demand for unregis-
tered workers, who receive lower wages than tempo-
rary workers and whose employers do not pay social
security contributions for them.4 As noted by Szretter
(1999), the use of unregistered workers may form
part of a broader strategy of tax evasion by some
firms.
To sum up, then, in all the countries studied, ex-
cept Chile and Brazil, there have been changes in the
level of overall labour contributions, calculated as a
percentage of gross wages. In Argentina thay have
gone down, while in Colombia, Mexico and Peru
they have increased slightly. In Chile, Colombia and
Peru there is no difference between the non-wage la-
bour costs of permanent and temporary workers, but
in Argentina and Brazil the employers’ contribution
in respect of temporary workers is lower. In Argen-
tina this difference is due to the established legisla-
tion, whereas in Brazil it is a matter of custom.
Colombia is in a special situation, as although the
rates of contributions are now similar for both types
of contracts, this was not so in 1988. Law No. 50
adopted in 1990 made it relatively more expensive to
hire temporary labour.
III
Trade openness and relative prices:
their effects on labour costs
and competitiveness
In the following analysis, we adopt the hypothesis
that there will be gains in competitiveness when la-
bour productivity rises faster than labour costs.
When the labour costs are calculated in national cur-
rency, however, in order to estimate their real level it
is necessary to decide what index to use: the con-
sumer price index (CPI) or the producer price index
(PPI). This decision is not devoid of importance,
since in the first few years after the initiation of trade
openness the two indexes evolve at different rates.
The CPI grows faster than the PPI and hence the
growth of real labour costs is smaller when deflated
by the CPI than it is when deflated by the PPI. As
workers are keen to defend the purchasing power of
their wages (that is to say, in relation to the CPI), they
tend to feel that the CPI does not rise sufficiently. In
contrast, when making their economic calculations
entrepreneurs take into account the rise in the firm’s
costs (including labour costs) compared with the
evolution of their products’ prices (the PPI), and
therefore perceive that when defined in this way the
growth of the index affects their competitiveness. In
this situation, which occurs in the early years of the
openness process, both sides –workers and employ-
ers– have opposite but equally justifiable attitudes to
the evolution of real labour costs.
The change in relative prices, depending on
whether they are based on the CPI and the PPI, is due
to the fact that the evolution of consumer prices more
strongly reflects the growth rate of the prices of
non-tradeable goods and services, which are usually
slower to adjust because they are less exposed to the
greater outside competition generated by trade open-
ness, whereas the evolution of producer prices is
more affected by the prices of tradeable goods,
which are quickly affected by trade openness and
tend to come into line with international prices.
Later on, once firms have adjusted to market
conditions, made improvements in their organization
of production and labour, and invested in technology
and staff training, the effect of competition shifts to
the non-tradeable goods sector. Relative prices then
begin to stabilize and the different perceptions of em-
ployers and workers on the evolution of labour costs
tend to disappear.
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In the three countries whose trade openness pro-
cesses began in the 1990s, the CPI grew faster than
the PPI, up to 1993 in Argentina and Colombia, and
up to 1994 in Peru (table 2). Since those dates, both
indexes have tended to evolve along similar lines,
and in Argentina the PPI has even grown faster than
the CPI.
Real labour costs (deflated by the consumer
price index) grew less than productivity in the period
from 1990 to 1995, except in Chile (table 3). Thus,
there were gains in competitiveness of around 10.2%
per year in Argentina, 3.4% in Brazil, 4.8% in
Mexico and 0.6% in Peru. If we break down labour
costs between wages and non-wage costs, we see
that both components grew along similar lines in
Brazil and Chile,5 but in Argentina non-wage labour
costs grew less than wages, while the opposite oc-
curred in Mexico and Peru.
However, in view of the different perceptions of
workers and employers in this respect, we must also
analyse the evolution of labour costs in relation to
the PPI. As may be seen from tables 4 and 5, the
growth in real labour costs is significantly greater
when deflated by the PPI than by the CPI. In Argen-
tina, the increase is 8.7% per year in the first case but
there is a decline of 2.0% per year if deflated by the
CPI (table 3). In Mexico and Brazil, labour costs at
producer prices rise 4 times more than at consumer
prices, in Peru 3 times more, and in Chile 1.6 times
as fast. As a result, from the entrepreneurs’ stand-
point there has been a loss of competitiveness in all
the countries except Mexico (table 4): a very differ-
ent situation from that observed when the CPI is used,
when all the countries except Chile increase their
competitiveness.
All this is due to the change in relative prices
resulting from the macroeconomic policies applied:
on the one hand, trade openness brings with it an
increase in the inflow of resources from abroad,
while on the other hand there are stabilization poli-
cies using the exchange rate as an anchor. The in-
crease in exports (mainly of primary commodities)
which accompanies the openness process also helps
to depress the exchange rate. This has a more rapid
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TABLE 2
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru:
Employment structure for industrial
wage-earners, by type of contract
Permanent Temporary No contract
contract contract
Argentina
1991 67.6 2.2 30.2






1996 74.7 9.6 15.5
Colombia
1988 62.7 7.4 29.9
1996 65.4 7.7 26.9
Peru
1989 55.0 16.1 28.9
1997 25.1 37.5 37.4
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of national studies.
a Workers “with papers”: includes workers with permanent and
temporary contracts.
TABLE 3
Argentina, Colombia and Peru: Annual variation in
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Argentina
CPI 1 344.0 84.0 17.6 7.4 3.9 1.6 0.1 0.3
PPI 798.0 56.7 3.2 0.1 5.8 6.0 2.1 -0.9
Colombia
CPI 32.4 26.8 25.1 22.6 22.6 19.7 21.6 17.7
PPI 29.9 23.1 17.9 13.2 20.7 15.4 14.5 17.5
Peru
CPI 7 650.0 139.0 56.7 39.5 15.4 10.2 11.8 6.5
PPI 6 534.0 96.0 50.5 34.1 10.5 8.8 11.4 5.0
Source: ECLAC.
5 It should be noted that in Chile the reduction in non-wage
labour costs took place in the early 1980s.
LABOUR COSTS AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING
SECTOR, 1990-1998 • VÍCTOR E. TOKMAN AND DANIEL MARTÍNEZ
effect on prices in the tradeables sectors (those which
are most important for producers) than in the
non-tradeable ones (which are most important for
the workers, in their capacity of consumers). Conse-
quently, the evolution of labour costs and incomes is
viewed differently by those concerned, while the
origin of this differential behaviour actually lies
outside the labour sphere.
IV
The structure of employment and
labour costs, 1990-1997
Because of limitations of information on labour costs
by types of contract, this section deals with only four
countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru. The
hourly labour costs of permanent, temporary and un-
registered workers are compared and the average la-
bour cost is calculated from the weighted sum of the
costs for these three types of workers. A calculation
is also made of the reduction observed in comparison
with a situation in which there were no changes in la-
bour legislation nor in the structure of manufacturing
employment by types of contract. In the light of the
growth in industrial productivity over the period in
question, a calculation is made of the gains and
losses in competitiveness with and without changes
in the structure of employment. The costs are mea-
sured in current dollars, thus making it possible to
analyse the effect of exchange rate lag on them and
on competitiveness, and finally the evolution of com-
petitiveness if there had not been an exchange rate
lag is estimated.
1. The structure of wage-earning employment
in the industrial sector
In the period analysed, the proportion of
wage-earners with permanent contracts in manufac-
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TABLE 4
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru: Evolution of
labour competitiveness in the manufacturing sector, 1990-1995





1990 0.95 0.60 1.55
1995 0.94 0.46 1.40




Annual variation 2.9 2.9 2.9 6.4 3.4
Chile (pesos)
1990 5.65 2.52 8.17
1995 6.98 3.10 10.08
Annual variation 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.6 -0.7
Mexico (pesos)
1990 4.98 2.33 7.31
1995 5.21 2.56 7.77
Annual variation 0.9 1.9 1.2 6.1 4.8
Peru (new soles)
1990 0.21 0.12 0.33
1995 0.26 0.16 0.42
Annual variation 4.4 5.9 5.1 5.7 0.6
Source: Prepared by the ILO.
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turing went down, except in Colombia, while the
proportion of workers with temporary contracts went
up, as also (except in Colombia) did the proportion
of workers without contracts (table 5).
In Argentina, the proportion of workers with
permanent contracts went down by 5.6 percentage
points between 1991 and 1998, while the proportions
of workers with temporary contracts and those with-
out any contract at all went up by almost 1.5 points
and rather more than 4 points, respectively. In Peru,
the proportion of workers with permanent contracts
went down by some 30 percentage points between
1989 and 1997, while the proportion of temporary
workers rose by over 20 points and that of workers
without contracts grew by 9 points. In Colombia,
however, the proportion of workers with permanent
contracts increased by 2.7 percentage points between
1988 and 1996, the proportion of unregistered work-
ers went down by 3 points, and that of workers with
temporary contracts increased by only 0.3 points.
As a result of these changes in the structure of
employment, wage-earning employment in manufac-
turing became more precarious in all the countries
studied except Colombia, this being particularly
marked in the case of Peru.
2. Labour costs by type of contract and
average labour costs
Let us look first at the labour costs for temporary and
unregistered workers, since the fact that they are
lower than those of permanent workers should in the-
ory lead to an increase in employment without a cor-
responding increase in lack of social protection or
precarious job tenure. We will therefore analyse the
contributions that employers have to pay for workers
with temporary contracts and the differences in
wages between permanent workers, those with tem-
porary contracts, and those with no contract at all.
Although, as already noted, the legislation does
not exempt employers from the obligation to make
contributions in respect of temporary workers (ex-
cept in Argentina), such contributions are smaller in
absolute terms because the gross wages of these
workers are lower than those of permanent workers.
In 1966, temporary workers in manufacturing re-
ceived 60%6 of the wages of permanent workers in
Argentina and Chile and 64%7 in Colombia and
Peru. As the contributions payable by employers are
the same percentage of gross wages, the hourly la-
bour cost of temporary workers in industry is lower
than that of permanent workers, by the same propor-
tion as the gross wage (34% less in Colombia and
Peru, and 40% less in Chile).
In Argentina, the hourly labour cost of tempo-
rary employees is 44% lower than that of permanent
workers. Of this overall difference, 62% corresponds
to wages and 38% to the exemption from employers’
contributions (table 6).
In the light of the wage differences reported by
the four countries in question (insufficient informa-
tion is available for Brazil) and the partial exemption
from employers’ contributions in Argentina, an esti-
mate can be made of the differences in hourly costs
by type of contract (tables 6 and 7). This estimate
shows that the cost of hiring a temporary worker is
between 56% and 65% of the cost of hiring a perma-
nent employee.
The potential effect of the lower cost of hiring
temporary workers on the average labour costs of a
firm depends on the percentage of the total number
of jobs that can legally be filled with temporary
workers under forms of contract promoted by the
legislation. In Argentina, this percentage cannot be
more than 30% in the case of firms with over 25
workers, it can be up to 50% in firms with between 6
and 25 workers, and there is no limit in the case of
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TABLE 5
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru:
Evolution of labour competitiveness in the
manufacturing sector, 1990-1995
(Annual growth rates, in national currency
deflated by PPI)
Country Real labour Productivity Competi-
costs tiveness
Argentina 8.7 8.0 -0.6
Brazil 12.5 6.4 -5.4
Chile 6.9 3.6 -3.1
Mexico 4.3 6.1 1.7
Peru 17.2 5.7 -9.8
Source: Prepared by the ILO.
6 Other studies indicate that the average wages of temporary
workers were 81.5% of those of permanent workers.
7 These figures refer to the average wages for each group. The
differences grow smaller as the workers’ years of schooling in-
crease. Thus, the average wages of workers with a university ed-
ucation are not significantly different, regardless of whether
they have temporary or permanent contracts.
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firms with less than 6 employees. In Chile, Colombia
and Peru the legislation does not specify any limit on
the proportion of such contracts.
Consequently, in a medium-sized firm which
can fill up to 30% of its jobs with temporary work-
ers, the use of the forms of contracts promoted by the
legislation would make it possible to reduce average
labour costs by around 13% in Argentina, 43% in
Chile, 34% in Colombia and 38% in Peru. It should
be noted, however, that in Chile this reform was in-
troduced in 1978, so that its effect on the reduction
of labour costs took place before the period studied.
3. The labour cost of unregistered workers
The non-wage labour costs of unregistered workers
are lower than those of workers with contracts, not
only because employers pay only a part of the legally
established contributions but also because such
workers’ gross wages are lower.
With regard to the contributions that should be
paid by the employer, it is believed that unregistered
workers do receive deferred wages (such as holidays
and bonuses), but there are doubts as to whether the
benefits in respect of holidays and extraordinary pay-
ments are the same for both registered and unregis-
tered workers. Szretter (1999) estimates that on
average unregistered workers receive only half the
deferred wages of workers with temporary contracts,
i.e., 6.6% of gross wages compared with 13.2% in
the case of temporary workers. For the purposes of
the present study, however, we have assumed that
workers without a contract receive the same benefits
as workers with temporary contracts in respect of
holidays and supplementary payments, which would
amount to 13.2% of gross wages in Argentina, 11.3%
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TABLE 6
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru: Hourly labour costs of
workers with permanent and temporary contracts in manufacturing
(Current dollars)
Permanent Temporary (1-year contract) Cost of
temporary
Non-wage Non-wage workers/cost
Wage cost Total Wage cost Total of permanent
workers
Argentina, 1998 4.57 1.96 6.53 2.76 0.87 3.63 0.56
Brazil, 1996 3.74 2.18 5.92 ... ... ... ...
Chile, 1996 2.37 0.91 3.28 1.43 0.54 1.97 0.60
Colombia, 1996 1.44 0.76 2.20 0.91 0.49 1.40 0.64
Peru, 1997 1.29 0.83 2.12 0.83 0.54 1.37 0.65
Source: Prepared by the ILO on the basis of official country data and case studies.
TABLE 7
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru: Labour
costs of workers with and without contracts, 1996
(Current dollars)
With contract Cost without contract/
Without contract cost with contract
Permanent Temporary Temporary Permanent
Argentina, 1998 6.53 3.63 3.01 0.83 0.46
Brazil, 1996 5.92 ... 1.26 ... 0.21
Chile, 1996 3.28 1.97 1.37 0.70 0.42
Colombia, 1996 2.20 1.40 0.90 0.64 0.41
Peru, 1997 2.12 1.32 1.01 0.76 0.48
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of national studies.
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in Brazil, 27.1% in Chile, 14.1% in Colombia and
29.7% in Peru.8
The gross wages of unregistered workers are
lower than those of workers with permanent or tem-
porary contracts. In the hypothetical situation as-
sumed above, the wages of workers without
contracts in the last year of the period studied would
represent 94% of the wages of temporary workers
and 58.3% of those of permanent employees in Ar-
gentina, 91% and 53% respectively in Chile, and
94% and 62% in Colombia, while in Peru they
would be similar to those of workers with temporary
contracts. In Brazil (where no information is avail-
able on the average wages of workers with tempo-
rary contracts), in 1996 the wages of workers
“without papers” were 30% of those of workers
“with papers”.
Thus, the cost of employing a worker without a
contract would be 17% less than the cost of a tempo-
rary employee in Argentina, 30% less in Chile, 36%
less in Colombia, and 24% less in Peru, while the
difference would be much greater compared with a
permanent employee (54% less in Argentina, 58% in
Chile, 59% in Colombia, 52% in Peru and 79% in
Brazil).
4. Average labour costs
On the basis of the labour costs for each type of con-
tract and structure of employment in manufacturing
(table 2), we can calculate the average hourly labour
costs for the period studied. Thus, in 1997 such costs
came to 5.12 current dollars in Argentina, 3.67 in
Brazil, 3.03 in Chile, 1.92 in Colombia and 1.73 in
Peru (table 8).
These average costs are between 13% and 29%
lower than they would be if all workers had perma-
nent contracts.9 As may be seen from table 8, the dif-
ference would be 29% in Brazil, 19% in Argentina
and Colombia, and 18% in Peru. Although this differ-
ence went down slightly over the last seven years in
Argentina, it remained unchanged in Colombia and
increased in Peru. This different behaviour is ex-
plained by the fact that although the proportion of
workers without contracts or with temporary con-
tracts increased in Argentina, there was a reduction
(from 70% in 1991 to 85% in 1997) in the relative
wage differential between unregistered and permanent
employees.10 In Peru, the increased difference is due
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TABLE 8
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru:
Hourly labour costs in manufacturing
(Current dollars)
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Peru
PERMa AVERb DIFFc PERM AVER DIFF PERM AVER DIFF PERM AVER DIFF PERM AVER DIFF
1988 ... ... - - - - ... … - 1.1 0.9 18% ... ... -
1989 ... ... - 2.37 1.84 22% ... … - … … - 0.96 0.81 16%
1990 ... ... - 2.25 1.73 23% 2.54 2.2 13% … … - ... ... -
1991 4.55 3.64 20% 2.32 1.77 24% ... … - … … - ... ... -
1996 6.33 5.04 20% 5.92 4.2 29% 3.4 2.95 13% 2.1 1.7 19% 2.2 ... -
1997 6.31 5.12 19% 5.17 3.67 29% 3.49 3.03 13% 2.37 1.92 19% 2.12 1.73 18%
Source: Country studies by ILO.
a Hourly labour cost of workers with permanent contracts.
b Average hourly labour cost of all workers in manufacturing.
c Difference between hourly costs.
8 The higher proportions in the cases of Chile and Peru are due
to the assumption that workers with and without contracts both
receive two extraordinary payments equivalent to the average
monthly wage in Peru and annual bonuses equivalent to 25% of
their gross monthly wages in Chile.
9 This is a theoretical maximum reduction, since it is not feasible
for all the workers in firms (public or private) to have permanent
contracts.
10 The evolution of wage differentials in Argentina should be
viewed with caution, because “unregistered workers” may in-
clude professionals providing services to firms without being
registered on the payroll. The salaries of such professionals are
usually higher than the average and also grow faster.
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to the fact that there were increases both in the pro-
portion of workers with temporary contracts or with-
out any contracts at all and in the wage differentials.
The estimated average labour costs are not only
lower than those that would have been registered if
all workers had permanent contracts but also lower
(except in Colombia) than those that would have ap-
plied if the employment structure obtaining in the
first year of the period studied had been maintained.
Thus, in 1997 the labour cost would have been 5.32
dollars instead of 5.12 dollars in Argentina (3.8%
higher) and 3.77 dollars instead of 3.67 dollars in
Brazil (2.7% higher). Only in Colombia would they
have been lower (1.89 dollars instead of 1.92 dollars
(1.6% lower). This has been the main economic ef-
fect of the more flexible rules on contracts. In a con-
text in which the exchange rate is used as an anchor
for stabilization policies, such flexibility should fa-
cilitate adjustment of the labour market and enable
the reduction in average labour costs, for a given





1. Labour costs and competitiveness
In the 1990s the average labour costs in manufactur-
ing (in current dollars) rose by 5.9% per year in Ar-
gentina, 9.0% in Brazil, 4.7% in Chile, 8.8% in
Colombia and 9.9% in Peru (table 9).
This significant increase (largely related to the
exchange rate lag registered in that decade) was less
than the increase in productivity11 in Argentina
(9.4% per year) and Chile (7.8%) but higher in
Brazil (5.3%), Colombia (3.5%) and Peru (3.4%).
Consequently, industrial productivity rose by around
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TABLE 9





With Without tivity With Without
changeb changeb changeb changeb
United States, 1990-1996 2.9 4.4 1.5
South Korea, 1990-1996 14.2 12.0 -1.9
Germany, 1990-1996 2.1 6.2 4.0
Argentina, 1991-1997 5.9 6.5 9.4 3.3 2.7
Brazil, 1989-1997 9.0 9.4 5.3 -3.4 -3.7
Chile, 1990-1997 4.7 ... 7.8 3.0 ...
Colombia, 1988-1997 8.8 8.6 3.5 -4.9 -4.7
Peru, 1989-1997 9.9 12.2 3.4 -5.9 -7.8
Source: Prepared by the ILO.
a Calculated through the following formula:
c =
(1 + q)
(1 + lc) −1
where
c = annual variation in competitiveness
q = annual variation in productivity
lc = annual variation in labour costs
b i.e., change in employment structure, by type of contract.
11 In terms of the gross value of output per worker, in current
dollars.
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3.0% per year in Argentina and Chile but went down
in Brazil (-3.4% per year), Colombia (-4.9% and
Peru (-5.9%).
The growth of competitiveness in Argentina and
Chile was higher than that registered in the United
States and South Korea between 1990 and 1996, due
mainly to the rapid increase in productivity in the
two Latin American countries, while the loss of com-
petitiveness of Brazil, Colombia and Peru (which
even exceeded the corresponding loss in Korea) was
due both to the rapid increase in labour costs and to
the modest growth of productivity.
How would competitiveness have evolved if in
1997 the employment structure in each country had
remained the same as that obtaining in the first year
of the period studied? The results indicate that in Ar-
gentina labour costs would have been 3.8% higher
than those actually registered, in Brazil 2.7% higher,
in Peru 15% higher, and in Colombia 1.6% lower.
This means that hourly labour costs would have in-
creased more per year than they did with the change
of structure in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, but
slightly less in Colombia. Thus, in Argentina, Brazil
and Peru industrial competitiveness would have in-
creased 0.5%, 0.2% and 1.9% less than it actually
did, respectively, while in Colombia the loss of com-
petitiveness would have been 0.2 percentage points
less (table 9).
The introduction of more precarious forms of
employment made it possible to reduce labour costs
because of the lower non-wage costs in Argentina
and because of the lower wages for non-permanent
labour in all the countries studied. Thus, Argentina
was able to increase its competitiveness in spite of
the fixed exchange rate and it was possible to partly
offset the loss of competitiveness due to slow pro-
ductivity growth and exchange rate lag in Brazil, Co-
lombia and Peru.
The increase in labour costs in dollars was due
to the increase in nominal wages in a context of ex-
change rate lag. Increased productivity, for its part,
was due mainly to the reduction in the level of em-
ployment.12 The evolution of competitiveness has
thus been determined by the influence of changes in
the employment structure and exchange rate policies
on labour costs and the effect of lower levels of em-
ployment on productivity.
2. Labour costs and the effective exchange rate
In the period studied, most of the countries in ques-
tion displayed over-valuation of the national cur-
rency and exchange rate lags, due both to the inflow
of foreign capital and to the use of the exchange rate
as an anchor in stabilization policies. In others, how-
ever, the exchange rate policies applied linked the lo-
cal currency to the relation between domestic and
external inflation, so that the exchange rate main-
tained its parity and rose at the same rate as inflation,
or even faster. In the latter case, there was under-
valuation of the national currency or devaluation in
real terms.
Real gains in labour competitiveness will occur
when the growth rate of labour productivity is higher
than that of labour costs and is also sufficient to off-
set the effects of exchange rate lag.
If we include in the analysis the effects produced
by exchange rate lag, using the effective exchange
rate given by the behaviour of the national currency
vis-à-vis those of the country’s main trading partners,
the levels of competitiveness given in table 9 change
significantly.
Let us now look at the evolution of manufacturing
competitiveness after correcting the lags or advances
of the effective exchange rate (tables 10 and 11).
When this is done, the competitiveness gains are
reduced and the losses increase in countries like
South Korea and Germany, which devalued their cur-
rencies to less than the equilibrium or parity level
with the currencies of their main trading partners. In
contrast, in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Peru, which had overvalued curren-
cies, exchange rate correction increases the gains in
competitiveness by Argentina and Chile, reduces the
losses of Colombia and Peru, and turns Brazil’s loss
into a gain.
In these circumstances, if we look at the behav-
iour by countries we see that in the period studied the
manufacturing productivity of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Peru rose significantly, but not
as fast as labour costs in the cases of Brazil, Colom-
bia and Peru (table 9), so that they suffered competi-
tiveness losses of 3.4%, 4.9% and 5.9% respectively.
The situation was different in Argentina and Chile,
where productivity rose faster than average labour
costs, giving rise to competitiveness gains of the or-
der of 3.3% and 3.0% respectively. If we introduce
exchange rate correction, however (table 10), the
gains in competitiveness would be still greater in the
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12 See Amadeo, Camargo, Frenkel and Hernández-Laos, 1999.
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cases of Argentina and Chile (9.3% and 5.0% per
year, respectively), the losses would be smaller in
Colombia (-0.2%) and Peru (-4.9%), and Brazil’s
loss would be turned into a gain of 2.0%.
With regard to countries outside the region, we
see that Germany’s gain in competitiveness would
have been smaller if it had not devalued its currency,
while South Korea’s loss would have been greater. In
the case of the United States, its gain in competitive-
ness would be slightly greater if account is taken of
the evolution of the dollar compared with the curren-
cies of its main trading partners.
To sum up, the analysis made so far shows that
the competitiveness of countries depends both on the
decisions taken by employers and workers that affect
labour costs and productivity and the macroeco-
nomic policies applied. During the period studied,
the exchange rate lag that existed in many countries
of the region made nominal labour costs higher and
reduced export income in national currency terms,
giving rise to loss of competitiveness in most cases.
As already noted, the exchange rate policies ap-
plied have been influenced by the inflow of
short-term foreign capital as a result of the open-
ing-up of markets, as well as by the stabilization pol-
icies applied. In the case of the countries studied
here, globalization would therefore appear to have
had not only the well-known positive effects but also
an exchange-rate effect which, so far, has adversely
affected manufacturing competitiveness. Further-
more, globalization shifts the burden of domestic ad-
justment onto costs (especially labour costs) and
productivity. The evolution of labour costs in the
countries studied affects competitiveness, but this ef-
fect depends on the evolution of productivity and
also on the effects of macroeconomic policies. In-
deed, during the period in question these factors
were more important than the evolution of wages and
wage-based taxes to finance social security benefits.
The incidence of exchange rate policy on labour
costs and competitiveness was clearly shown by the
devaluations made by all the countries except Argen-
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TABLE 10
Selected countries: Evolution of labour competitiveness
in manufacturing after exchange-rate correction
Productivity Labour costs Effective exchange rate Annual variation in
(base year=100) (base year=100) (base year=100) competitivenessa
United States, 1990-1996 129.5 118.7 96.9 2.0
South Korea, 1990-1996 197.4 221.8 118.0 -4.6
Germany, 1990-1996 143.5 113.3 122.5 0.6
Argentina, 1991-1997 171.4 141.1 71.3 9.3
Brazil, 1989-1997 151.2 199.3 64.5 2.0
Chile, 1990-1997 169.2 137.9 87.2 5.0
Colombia, 1988-1997 136.3 213.6 64.7 -0.2
Peru, 1989-1997 130.7 212.8 91.8 -4.9
Source: Table 9 above and ECLAC for effective exchange rate.
a Calculated through the following formula:
c =







where c is the annual variation in competitiveness, q is the annual variation in productivity, er is the annual variation in the effective
exchange rate, and lc is the annual variation in labour costs.
TABLE 11




rate lag or rate lag or
advance advance
United States, 1990-1996 1.5 2.0
South Korea, 1990-1996 -1.9 -4.6
Germany, 1990-1996 4.0 0.6
Argentina, 1991-1997 3.3 9.3
Brazil, 1989-1997 -3.4 2.0
Chile, 1990-1997 3.0 5.0
Colombia, 1988-1997 -4.9 -0.2
Peru, 1989-1997 -5.9 -4.9
Source: Tables 9 and 10 above.
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tina to compensate for the effects of the maxi-deval-
uations effected by the Asian countries in 1997.
3. Labour costs and competitiveness in the
context of the Southeast Asian crisis
The measures taken by the Southeast Asian countries
to deal with the crisis that affected them as from the
second half of 1997 forced Latin American firms to
make greater efforts in order at least to maintain their
levels of relative competitiveness vis-à-vis those
countries.
The devaluations made by the Southeast Asian
countries led to reductions in labour costs in dollar
terms between the first half of 1997 and the first half
of 1998 which amounted to 24.8% in Thailand,
28.1% in the Philippines, 33.1% in South Korea,
34.9% in Indonesia and 38.4% in Malaysia. This re-
duction in labour costs occurred in the midst of a
generalized contraction of real wages due to the
speeding-up of inflation in all these countries. At the
same time, average labour productivity in the manu-
facturing sector also declined because employment
did not go down in proportion to the abrupt drop in
industrial production during the adjustment (ILO,
1998).
As a result of the evolution of labour costs and
productivity, manufacturing sector productivity rose
significantly in all the Southeast Asian countries dur-
ing the first half of 1998 as compared with the same
period the year before, with the gains in competitive-
ness ranging from 40% to 60%, except in Thailand
(21.4%).
Consequently, the competitiveness of the Latin
American countries would have had to increase by
between 20% and 60% in 1998 merely in order to
maintain their pre-crisis levels of relative competi-
tiveness. As it was difficult, if not impossible, to
make a fresh reduction in labour costs of this magni-
tude and it was not possible either to raise productiv-
ity by the same amount in the short term, the only
possibility was to reorient exchange-rate policy: i.e.,
to devalue the national currency more in order to
reduce costs in dollar terms.
Between the first half of 1996 and the first half
of 1997 (that is to say, the twelve months before the
Asian crisis) there were substantial gains in manufac-
turing sector competitiveness in all the countries
studied except Chile, where there was a decline of
4.1% (figure 1). The increase in productivity in those
twelve months (Argentina: 7.5%; Brazil: 6.1% and
Peru: 4.4%) was due to the rapid growth of output
per hour worked (5.4% in Peru and 7.5% in Argen-
tina and Brazil), while labour costs rose by only
0.2% in Argentina and a little over 1.0% in Brazil
and Peru. In Colombia, the 6.2% increase in compet-
itiveness was due entirely to the reduction in labour
costs in dollars because of the devaluation of the
peso, since productivity rose by only 0.7%.
In contrast with the foregoing, the evolution of
labour costs and productivity in the context of the
Asian crisis –that is to say, between the first half of
1997 and the first half of 1998– indicates that labour
costs went down in all the countries except Argentina
(by 0.4% in Brazil, 1.9% in Chile, 4.9% in Colombia
and 4.3% in Peru) (figure 2). Obviously, these reduc-
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FIGURE 1
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru:
Annual variation in labour costs, productivity
and competitiveness in the manufacturing sector
(First half of 1996-first half of 1997)
Labour Produc- Competi-
costs 97 tivity 97 tiveness 97
FIGURE 2
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru:
Annual variation in labour costs, productivity
and competitiveness in the manufacturing sector
(First half of 1997-first half of 1998)
Labour Produc- Competi-
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tions –which took place even though real wages in-
creased (except in Argentina and Peru) because the
adjustment was being carried out without increasing
inflation– were associated with the major (Chile, Co-
lombia and Peru) or minor (Brazil) devaluations of
the respective national currencies in these twelve
months. Parallel with this reduction in labour costs in
dollar terms, all the countries except Peru registered
increases in productivity (physical output per hour
worked): 3.9% in Brazil, 4% in Chile and 5.4% in
Colombia. This caused competitiveness to rise by be-
tween 4.3% (Brazil) and 10.9% (Colombia) (figure
2). In Peru, although labour costs in dollar terms
went down due to the devaluation, productivity
dropped by 4%, so that the rise in competitiveness
was only 0.3%. In Argentina, although labour costs
increased in dollar terms, competitiveness neverthe-
less rose by 3.7% thanks to the 6.8% increase in pro-
ductivity due to both the growth of physical output
and a slight reduction in manufacturing sector em-
ployment.
To sum up, then, the increases in productivity
obtained in some countries thanks to the expansion
of industrial output and lower levels of manufactur-
ing sector employment, as well as the devaluations
made in other countries, which helped to reduce la-
bour costs in dollars, made it possible to improve
competitiveness in the twelve months following the
onset of the Asian crisis. Nevertheless, this did not
prevent a loss of relative competitiveness, because as
already noted, the Asian countries increased their
competitiveness even more, thanks to the reduction




At least five conclusions may be drawn from the
analysis made in this study. Firstly, there was a
change in the structure of private sector employment
in terms of forms of hiring. There was an increase in
the proportion of workers with temporary contracts
or no contract at all (except, in the latter case, in Co-
lombia) and a decrease in the proportion with perma-
nent contracts.
Secondly, in some countries the rates of contri-
butions payable by employers in respect of workers
with temporary contracts were reduced to promote
the hiring of such workers.
Thirdly, as a result of the foregoing, average la-
bour costs (calculated by weighting the labour costs
by type of contract by the weight of such contracts in
total employment) rose less than would have been
the case if there had not been a change in the struc-
ture of wage labour and an accentuation in wage dif-
ferences. Consequently, some countries obtained
greater competitiveness gains than they would have
attained in the absence of such changes, while others
suffered less serious losses of competitiveness than
they would otherwise have undergone. The only ex-
ception was Colombia, where the changes led to a
slightly greater increase in labour costs than would
otherwise have been the case.
Fourthly, even in those countries which regis-
tered losses of competitiveness (Brazil, Colombia
and Peru), these were not due to a drop in productiv-
ity but to rapid increases in labour costs expressed in
current dollars. These increases were due partly to
increases in real wages, but mainly to exchange rate
lags which drove up labour costs significantly. As we
saw in the previous section, the correction of these
lags in 1998 made it possible to reduce labour costs
and thus partly compensate for the loss of competi-
tiveness generated by the maxi-devaluations regis-
tered in the Southeast Asian countries.
Fifthly, it does not seem likely that recovery of
the competitiveness lost after the Asian crisis and,
more recently, the problems in Brazil, can be based
on spectacular increases in productivity or on the re-
duction of labour costs through the promotion of
more precarious forms of employment, the contrac-
tion of nominal wages, or a significant reduction in
employers’ contributions.13 Consequently, competi-
tiveness gains should be based, in the short term, on
the reorientation of exchange and interest-rate poli-
13 This does not mean that efforts should not be made to reduce
or eliminate contributions which do not generate benefits for
the workers, especially in the case of microenterprises or
small-scale enterprises.
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cies and, in the longer term, on strategies to raise
productivity which involve both employers and
workers.
Such strategies would affect labour policy as re-
gards labour relations, both individual and collective.
With regard to individual relations, a matter for con-
cern are the effects of more precarious forms of em-
ployment on both the security and personal and
family development of workers and on the develop-
ment of their productivity potential, especially if
their possibilities of participating in training and re-
training programmes and activities are only limited.
It would be desirable to explore the possibility
of reducing the proportion of temporary workers and
providing incentives for stable employment by re-
ducing the cost of longer-term contracts. In addition,
unemployment insurance arrangements should be de-
veloped, combined with training programmes for
those receiving such benefits, designed to improve
the “employability” of workers and –if made com-
pulsory throughout the period when a worker is re-
ceiving unemployment benefit– to discourage
protracted unemployment.
Collective labour relations (more specifically
collective negotiation) form the second area for ef-
forts to raise productivity. It is necessary to progress
from a vision of collective negotiation seen as a
means for avoiding over-exploitation of workers and
achieving social peace to the concept of collective
negotiation as a means of arriving at undertakings
between workers and employers to apply strategies
that will raise productivity and share its benefits
more equitably.
One such strategy could be to establish a link
between wages and productivity, so that, after fixing
a minimum level determined by the existing wage
level, all wage increases during the agreed period
must be tied to the productivity increases obtained,
measured according to formulas agreed between both
sides.
Another strategy negotiated between employers
and workers could be to promote participation by the
latter in decisions on the organization of the various
stages in the production process and quality control
and establish incentives for the submission of pro-
posals for raising productivity.
Likewise, concerted training plans could be es-
tablished through collective negotiation within the
enterprises, which, like the other incentives, would
result in productivity increases in both the short and
long term.
In short, the recovery of lost competitiveness
and the attainment of further advances in this respect
should be based on increases in productivity rather
than on cost reductions achieved through more pre-
carious job tenure or a lower level of employment.
Greater job security and the promotion of collective
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